IRI Policy Lab Historical Elections Codebook

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Indicator name** | **Indicator description** | **Dataset** | **Cause/outcome** | **My reconciled indicator** |
| sr23viol | Election Day Violence and Unrest | QED | Outcome | post\_elec\_violence |
| resultsi | Election results reactions | PEI | Outcome | post\_elec\_violence |
| protestpart | The extent of public participation in post-election protest | IAEP | Outome | post\_elec\_violence |
| Turnout | Election turnout | PEI | Outcome | turnout |
| legelig | Legislative election turnout | IAEP | Outcome | turnout |
| execelig | Executive election turnout | IAEP | Outcome | turnout |
| sa2 | Extent of electoral integrity problems | QED | Outcome | elec\_integrity |
| PEIIndexi | PEI index of electoral integrity | PEI | Outcome | elec\_integrity |
| sr21cheat | Election Day explicit cheating | QED | Outcome | *elec\_explicit\_cheating* |
| counti | Vote count index | PEI | Outcome | *elec\_explicit\_cheating* |
| sr0str | Pre-election legal structural environment | QED | Cause | *pre\_elec\_legal\_integrity* |
| lawsi | Electoral laws index | PEI | Cause | *pre\_elec\_legal\_integrity* |
| *fragment* | A measure of political fragmentation | Polity | Cause |  |
| *polity2* | A composite and, if necessary, imputed measure of government. Ranging from full autocracy to full democracy | Polity | Cause |  |
| *durable* | The number of years since the most recent regime change | Polity | Cause |  |
| *parreg* | A measure of political participation. | Polity | Cause |  |
| *parcomp* | A measure of political competition. | Polity | Cause |  |
| *regtrans* | A measure of regime changes/transitions | Polity | Cause |  |
| *status* | A composite of FreedomHouse’s measures for political rights and civil liberties. | FH | Cause |  |
| *fh\_total* | A composite of FreedomHouse’s measures for political rights and civil liberties.  Combines Political Rights (0-40 points) and Civil Liberties (0-40 points). | FH | Cause |  |
| *GDP per capita (constant 2015 US$)* |  | WB | Cause |  |
| *Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$)* |  | WB | Cause |  |
| *Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)* |  | WB | Cause |  |
| *Gini index* |  | WB | Cause |  |

***post\_elec\_violence*:** Post-election violence indictor (adapts PEI & IAEP scores to QED scores)

QED: sr23viol

Election Day Violence and Unrest  
0: Good -- no problems  
1: low --minor problems only  
2: moderate --moderate problems  
3: high --major problems  
This variable captures physical abuses, overall violent clashes, or manhandling of persons on the day of the election.

* Security was a concern
* Grenades
* Murders
* Physical Assaults/abuse
* Mentions of protests turned violent

PEI: resultsi

This is an additive scale created by summing the four previous variables (challenged2, protestpeace2, protestviolent2, disputes) , with missing values substituted via multiple imputation, and standardized to a 0-100 point scale. Higher values denote higher integrity.

0: Good – (76-100)

1: Low – (51-75)

2: Moderate - (26-50)

3: High – (0-25)

IAEP: protestpart

The extent of public participation in the protest:

NA: No post-election protest/violence.  
1. Low participation: single location, less than 1000 people.  
2. Moderate participation: single or multiple locations: multiple with under 1000 people, single with more than 1000.  
3. Widespread participation: multiple locations in the country, involving more than 1000 people in those multiple locations.

***turnout:*** mean turnout values from PEI and IAEP

PEI: Turnout

IAEP: legelig (numeric) – Percentage of eligible population voting in legislative elections.  
execelig (numeric) – Percentage of eligible population voting in executive elections (if separate from legislative elections).

***elec\_integrity****:* were there election integrity issues? (adapts PEI scores to QED scores)

QED: sa2: extent of problems.  
This variable assesses the extent of the problems in the election. This is a  
combined assessment that considers problems in the legal framework, political  
and administrative problems in the pre-election period, and then the integrity of  
the election day itself. It is coded as follows:  
0: Good -- no problems  
1: low --minor problems only  
2: moderate --moderate problems  
3: high --major problems

PEI: PEIIndexi

PEI index of electoral integrity, (0-100), imputed. The PEI index is designed to provide an overall summary evaluation of expert perceptions that an election meets international standards and global norms. It is generated at the individual level. Unlike the individual index (PEIIndex) PEIIndexi is imputed and thus fully observed for all experts and states.

***pre\_elec\_legal\_integrity*:** Pre-election integrity of legal structure (adapts PEI scores to QED scores)

QED: sr0str: structural environment  
0: Good -- no problems  
1: low --minor problems only  
2: moderate --moderate problems  
3: high --major problems  
This variable pertains to the quality of the legal framework for holding the elections. The problems noted here must be legal in nature, not simply behavioral. That is, if the underlying law is fine, but the problems are with implementation, then they do not get coded under the legal framework. Legal problems include, but are not limited to criticisms about the election law that report stresses.

PEI: lawsi: Electoral laws index (0-100), imputed  
This is an additive scale created by summing the three previous variables (lawsunfair2, favoredincumbent2, citizens2), with missing values substituted via multiple imputation, and standardized to a 0-100 point scale. Higher values denote higher integrity.

***elec\_explicit\_cheating*:** Indicates election day explicit cheating (adapts PEI scores to QED scores)

QED: sr21cheat: Election Day explicit cheating.  
0: Good -- no problems  
1: low --minor problems only  
2: moderate --moderate problems  
3: high --major problems  
This variable captures fraud related to the tabulation of the votes such as

* Vote padding
* Inflated Vote Count/Ballot stuffing
* Tampering with ballots or ballot box
* Falsification of election protocols
* Voter turn out higher than 100% / Suspicious high turn out figures
* Evidence of attempts to tamper with the ballot boxes
* Problems in the counting/tabulation
* Invalidated too many ballots for unsound reasons

PEI: counti 9-6i. Vote count index (0-100), imputed  
This is an additive scale created by summing the five previous variables (secure, delay, faircount, intlmonitors2, domesticmonitors2) , with missing values substituted via multiple imputation, and standardized to a 0-100 point scale. Higher values denote higher integrity.

***fragment****:* A measure of political fragmentation from Polity

Polity Fragmentation: This variable codes the operational existence of a separate polity, or polities, comprising substantial territory and population within the recognized borders of the state and over which the coded polity exercises no effective authority (effective authority may be participatory or coercive). Local autonomy arrangements voluntarily established and accepted by both central and local authorities are not considered fragmentation. A polity that can not exercise relatively effective authority over at least 50 percent of its established territory is necessarily considered to be in a condition of “state failure” (i.e., interruption or interregnum, see below, that may or may not coincide with active civil war). Polity fragmentation may result from open warfare (active or latent) or foreign occupation and may continue in the absence of open warfare as a situation of de facto separation remains unresolved and unchallenged by the state.   
(0) No overt fragmentation  
(1) Slight fragmentation: Less than ten percent of the country’s territory is effectively under  
local authority and actively separated from the central authority of the regime.  
(2) Moderate fragmentation: Ten to twenty-five percent of the country’s territory is effectively  
ruled by local authority and actively separated from the central authority of the regime.  
(3) Serious fragmentation: Over twenty-five percent (and up to fifty percent) of the country’s  
territory is effectively ruled by local authority and actively separated from the central  
authority of the regime.

***polity2:*** A composite and, if necessary, imputed measure of government from Polity. Ranging from full autocracy to full democracy.

2.4 POLITY2 (p5 only)  
Revised Combined Polity Score: This variable is a modified version of the POLITY variable added in order to facilitate the use of the POLITY regime measure in time-series analyses. It modifies the combined annual POLITY score by applying a simple treatment, or ““fix,” to convert instances of “standardized authority scores” (i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to conventional polity scores (i.e., within the range, -10 to +10).

Combined Polity Score: The POLITY score is computed by subtracting the AUTOC score from the DEMOC score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).

***durable***

2.5 DURABLE (p5 only) Regime Durability: The number of years since the most recent regime change (defined by a three- point change in the POLITY score over a period of three years or less) or the end of transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions (denoted by a standardized authority score). In calculating the DURABLE value, the first year during which a new (post-change) polity is established is coded as the baseline “year zero” (value = 0) and each subsequent year adds one to the value of the DURABLE variable consecutively until a new regime change or transition period occurs. Values are entered for all years beginning with the first regime change since 1800 or the date of independence if that event occurred after 1800.

***parreg*:** A measure of political participation from Polity.

3.5 PARREG (all versions)  
Regulation of Participation: Participation is regulated to the extent that there are binding rules on when, whether, and how political preferences are expressed. One-party states and Western democracies both regulate participation but they do so in different ways, the former by channeling participation through a single party structure, with sharp limits on diversity of opinion; the latter by allowing relatively stable and enduring groups to compete nonviolently for political influence. The polar opposite is unregulated participation, in which there are no enduring national political organizations and no effective regime controls on political activity. In such situations political competition is fluid and often characterized by recurring coercion among shifting coalitions of partisan groups. A five-category scale is used to code this dimension:

(1) Unregulated: Political participation is fluid; there are no enduring national political organizations and no systematic regime controls on political activity. Political groupings tend to form around particular leaders, regional interests, religious or ethnic or clan groups, etc.; but the number and relative importance of such groups in national political life varies substantially over time.  
(2) Multiple Identity: There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which compete for political influence at the national level–parties, regional groups, or ethnic groups, not necessarily elected–but there are few, recognized overlapping (common) interests.  
(3) Sectarian: Political demands are characterized by incompatible interests and intransigent posturing among multiple identity groups and oscillate more or less regularly between intense factionalism and government favoritism, that is, when one identity group secures central power it favors group members in central allocations and restricts competing groups' political activities, until it is displaced in turn (i.e., active factionalism). Also coded here are polities in which political groups are based on restricted membership and significant portions of the population historically have been excluded from access to positions of power (latent factionalism, e.g., indigenous peoples in some South American countries).  
(4) Restricted: Some organized political participation is permitted without intense  
factionalism but significant groups, issues, and/or types of conventional participation are  
regularly excluded from the political process.  
(5) Regulated: Relatively stable and enduring political groups regularly compete for political  
influence and positions with little use of coercion. No significant groups, issues, or types of  
conventional political action are regularly excluded from the political process.

***parcomp***: A measure of political competition from Polity.

3.6 PARCOMP (all versions)  
The Competitiveness of Participation: The competitiveness of participation refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena. Political competition implies a significant degree of civil interaction, so polities which are coded Unregulated (1) on Regulation of Participation (PARREG, variable 2.5) are not coded for competitiveness. Polities in transition between Unregulated and any of the regulated forms on variable 2.5 also are not coded on variable 2.6. Competitiveness is coded on a five-category scale.

(0) Not Applicable: This is used for polities that are coded as Unregulated, or moving to/from that position, in Regulation of Political Participation (variable 2.6).  
(1) Repressed: No significant oppositional activity is permitted outside the ranks of the regime and ruling party. Totalitarian party systems, authoritarian military dictatorships, and despotic monarchies are typically coded here. However, the mere existence of these structures is not sufficient for a Repressed coding. The regime's institutional structure must also be matched by its demonstrated ability to repress oppositional competition.

(2) Suppressed: Some organized, political competition occurs outside government, without serious factionalism; but the regime systematically and sharply limits its form, extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups (20% or more of the adult population) from participation. Suppressed competition is distinguished from Factional competition (below) by the systematic, persisting nature of the restrictions: large classes of people, groups, or  
types of peaceful political competition are continuously excluded from the political process. As an operational rule, the banning of a political party which received more than 10% of the vote in a recent national election is sufficient evidence that competition is "suppressed." However, other information is required to determine whether the appropriate coding is (2) Suppressed or (3) Factional competition. This category is also used to characterize transitions between Factional and Repressed competition. Examples of "suppression" are:

i. Prohibiting some kinds of political organizations, either by type or group of people involved (e.g., no national political parties or no ethnic political organizations).

ii. Prohibiting some kinds of political action (e.g., Communist parties may organize but are prohibited from competing in elections).

iii. Systematic harassment of political opposition (leaders killed, jailed, or sent into exile; candidates regularly ruled off ballots; opposition media banned, etc.). This is evidence for either Factional, Suppressed, or Repressed, depending on the nature of the regime, the opposition, and the persistence of political groups.

Note 3.6: A newly enacted right to engage in political activities is most likely a change from category 1 to 2.  
(3) Factional: Polities with parochial or ethnic-based political factions that regularly compete for political influence in order to promote particularist agendas and favor group members to the detriment of common, secular, or cross-cutting agendas.  
(4) Transitional: Any transitional arrangement from Restricted, Suppressed, or Factional patterns to fully Competitive patterns, or vice versa. Transitional arrangements are accommodative of competing, parochial interests but have not fully linked parochial with broader, general interests. Sectarian and secular interest groups coexist.  
(5) Competitive: There are relatively stable and enduring, secular political groups which regularly compete for political influence at the national level; ruling groups and coalitions regularly, voluntarily transfer central power to competing groups. Competition among groups seldom involves coercion or disruption. Small parties or political groups may be restricted in the Competitive pattern.

***regtrans****:* A measure of regime changes/transitions from Polity.

Regime Transition: The Polity has undergone a substantive regime transition, defined as a “regime change.” A “regime change” is defined simply as a three-point change in either the polity’s DEMOC or AUTOC score and may be either a negative value change (i.e., “negative regime change” or “adverse regime transition”) or a positive value change (i.e., “positive regime change, “minor democratic transition,” or “major democratic transition”). An “adverse regime transition” is defined as a six-point decrease in the polity’s POLITY score or by an interregnal period (-77) that denotes a collapse of central authority or a revolutionary transformation in the mode of governance. A “democratic transition” is defined as at least a three-point POLITY value change in three years or  
less from autocracy (i.e., a negative or zero POLITY score) to a partial democracy (POLITY values +1 to +6) or full democracy (POLITY values +7 to +10). The REGTRANS value is coded according to the CHANGE value assigned for a continuous regime transition; REGTRANS records the same value for each year in a multi-year regime transition (i.e., from the last recoded POLITY prior to transition to the establishment of a new Polity). Each year of a regime transition has a recorded value from 3 to -2; this method is used to facilitate the isolation of regime transition data  
from the full data record. The REGTRANS variable is coded according to the following scale:  
+3 Major Democratic Transition – six points or greater increase in POLITY score over a period of three years or less including a shift from an autocratic POLITY value (-10 to 0) to a partial democratic POLITY value (+1 to +6) or full democratic POLITY value (+7 to +10) or a shift from a partial democratic value to a full democratic value.

+2 Minor Democratic Transition – three to five point increase in POLITY score over a period of three years or less including a shift from autocratic to partial democratic or from partial to full democratic value (see definitions above).  
+1 Positive Regime Change – three or more point increase in POLITY score without a shift in regime type as defined above.  
0 Little or No Change in POLITY score.  
-1 Negative Regime Change – three to five point decrease in POLITY score.  
-2 Adverse Regime Transition – six or more point decrease in POLITY score or an interregnal period (!77) denoting a collapse of central state authority or a revolutionary transformation in the mode of governance (not a democratic  
transition).  
-77 State Failure – complete collapse of central political authority  
Special Auxiliary Codes (see 4.10 CHANGE for a description of values):  
-66 Interruption  
96 State Disintegration  
97 State Transformation  
98 State Demise  
99 State Creation

***status:*** A composite of FreedomHouse’s measures for political rights and civil liberties.

Chart, timeline

Description automatically generated

***fh\_total:*** A composite of FreedomHouse’s measures for political rights and civil liberties.

Combines Political Rights (0-40 points) and Civil Liberties (0-40 points)

Political rights: ELECTORAL PROCESS, POLITICAL PLURALISM AND PARTICIPATION, FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT.

Civil liberties: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND BELIEF, **ASSOCIATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL RIGHTS, RULE OF LAW, PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS**.

Full methodology: https://freedomhouse.org/reports/freedom-world/freedom-world-research-methodology

***GDP per capita (constant 2015 US$):*** From the World Bank national accounts data.

***Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$)***: From International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments database, supplemented by data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and official national sources.

***Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)***: From International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics and data files.

***Gini index***: From World Bank, Poverty and Inequality Platform.

For additional information, see codebooks for respective databases:

QED: <https://sites.duke.edu/kelley/files/2014/03/CodebookQED.pdf>

IAEP: <https://havardhegre.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/users_manual_iaep.pdf>   
PEI: <https://dvn-cloud.s3.amazonaws.com/10.7910/DVN/PDYRWL/16aa80736a1-6fa6dae3d0ac?response-content-disposition=attachment%3B%20filename%2A%3DUTF-8%27%27PEI%25207.0%2520Codebook%2520v2%2520.pdf&response-content-type=application%2Fpdf&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20220419T174835Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=3600&X-Amz-Credential=AKIAIEJ3NV7UYCSRJC7A%2F20220419%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=ef4f44ce7c9596f41fedf06adb956ad9160c25aba5273e858a7a682ee7cea893>